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Abstract—Bribery in election (or computational social choice in
general) is an important problem that has received a considerable
amount of attention. In the classic bribery problem, the briber
(or attacker) bribes some voters in attempting to make the
briber’s designated candidate win an election. In this paper, we
introduce a novel variant of the bribery problem, “Election with
Bribed Voter Uncertainty” or BVU for short, accommodating
the uncertainty that the vote of a bribed voter may or may
not be counted. This uncertainty occurs either because a bribed
voter may not cast its vote in fear of being caught, or because a
bribed voter is indeed caught and therefore its vote is discarded.
As a first step towards ultimately understanding and addressing
this important problem, we show that it does not admit any
multiplicative O(1)-approximation algorithm modulo standard
complexity assumptions. We further show that there is an
approximation algorithm that returns a solution with an additive-
ε error in FPT time for any fixed ε .
I. INTRODUCTION
In multiagent systems, election (or voting) is an important
mechanism for collective decision-making. This importance
has led to extensive investigations of various aspects of
election. Indeed, the field of computational social choice
investigates algorithmic and computational complexity aspects
of this mechanism (see, e.g., the book by Brandt et al. (2016)).
In this paper, we focus on two important aspects of election
that have received an extensive amount of attention but are
still not fully understood: uncertainty and bribery.
Uncertainty. Most studies in election investigated determinis-
tic models and did not consider uncertainty, which is however
often encountered in real-world scenarios. There are two
exceptions. One exception is the investigation of uncertainty
from the perspective of the possible winner. In this perspective,
the input is incomplete and the problem is to determine if it is
possible to extend the incomplete input to make a designated
candidate win or lose. The uncertainty can be incurred by
voters’ incomplete preference lists, as shown by Konczak and
Lang (2005); Xia and Conitzer (2011); Betzler and Dorn
(2010); Baumeister and Rothe (2012); Betzler et al. (2009).
The uncertainty can also be incurred by an incomplete set
of candidates (e.g., additional candidates may be added), as
shown by Chevaleyre et al. (2010); Xia et al. (2011); Baumeis-
ter et al. (2011). The other exception is the investigation
of uncertainty incurred by complete but probabilistic inputs.
For example, Wojtas and Faliszewski (2012) introduced an
election model in which voters or candidates may have some
probabilities of no-show, either because the communication
network is not reliable or because voters inherently behave as
such.
Bribery. Faliszewski et al. (2009a) introduced the bribery
problem in which a briber (or attacker) attempts to make a
designated candidate win by paying a (monetary) bribe to
some voters. Once bribed, a voter will vote for the candi-
date designated by the attacker. This problem has received
a considerable amount of attention; see, e.g., Lin (2010);
Brelsford et al. (2008); Xia (2012); Faliszewski et al. (2015,
2011, 2009b); Parkes and Xia (2012). Most studies in this
context consider deterministic models, but researchers have
started investigating the issue of uncertainty in this context as
well. For example, Erdelyi et al. (2014) considered the bribery
problem with uncertain voting rules; Mattei et al. (2015)
considered the bribery problem with uncertain information,
Erde´lyi et al. (2009) considered uncertainty in the lobbying
problem, which is related to, but different from, the bribery
problem.
New problem: Election with Bribed Voter Uncertainty
(BVU). We observe that in the context of the bribery problem,
there is an inherent uncertainty that has not been considered
in the literature: The vote of a bribed voter may or may not
be counted, either because a bribed voter may choose not to
cast its vote in fear of being caught, or because a bribed voter
is indeed caught and therefore its vote is discarded. In this
setting, each voter is associated with a price of being bribed
as well as a probability that its vote is not counted upon
taking a bribe. The goal of the attacker is to bribe a subset of
voters such that the total bribing cost does not exceed a given
budget, while the probability that a designated candidate wins
the election is maximized.
The importance of understanding bribed voter uncertainty
cannot be overestimated. This is because, even with the
proliferation of anonymous and unregulated cryptocurrencies
(e.g., Bitcoin) that are deemed as ideal for bribery purposes,
there is still a possibility that a bribe-taking voter is detected
(see Goldfeder et al. (2017)). In the United States, telling
a voter whom to vote for is one type of voting fraud and
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may cause the votes to be discarded (seeHeritage Foundation
(2018) (2018)), as attested by the case that the Wetumpka
City Council District 2 election was switched after 8 ballots
were ruled (by a judge) to be thrown out (seeArwood (2017)
(2017)).
A. Our Contributions
In this paper we make three main conributions. First, we
introduce and initiate the study of the BVU problem, which
captures a new form of uncertainty in bribery.
Second, we characterize the hardness of the BVU problem
and show that the newly captured uncertainty completely
changes the complexity of the bribery problem as follows. In
the absence of uncertainty, the bribery problem can be solved
by a simple greedy algorithm (as shown by Faliszewski et al.
(2009a)). In the presence of uncertainty, assuming P 6= NP,
there is no O(1)-approximation algorithm even if there are
only two candidates; assuming W [1] 6= FPT, there is no O(1)-
approximation algorithm that runs in FPT time parameterized
by r, which is the difference between the number of votes
received by the winner and the number of votes received by
the designated candidate in the absence of bribery.
Third, despite the strong hardness result mentioned above,
we show the existence of an additive ε-approximation FPT
algorithm when the number of candidates is a constant. This
means that for an arbitrary small ε > 0, there is an algorithm
that runs in FPT-time (parameterized by the parameter r
mentioned above) and returns an approximate solution with
an objective value that is at most ε smaller than the optimal
objective value. This result relies on a reduction from the BVU
problem to a new variant of the knapsack problem (involving
a stochastic objective and multiple cardinality constraints)
and an approximation algorithm for this new variant of the
knapsack problem (while leveraging dynamic programming
and a non-trivial application of Berry-Essen’s Theorem). Both
the proof technique and the new variant of the knapsack
problem may be of independent interest.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PRELIMINARIES
The basic election model. In the basic election model, there
are a set of m candidates C = {c1,c2, . . . ,cm} and a set of n
voters V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn}. Each voter has a preference over
the candidates. There is a voting rule according to which a
winner is selected. In this paper we focus on the plurality rule
with a single winner, namely that every voter votes for its
most preferred candidate and the winner is the candidate that
receives the highest number of votes.
The classic bribery problem in the basic election model.
A voter may be bribed to deviate from its own preference.
Suppose each voter vi has a price qi. If vi takes a bribe of
amount qi from the briber (or attacker), then vi will vote,
regardless of vi’s own preference, for the designated candidate
of the brier (i.e., the candidate preferred by the briber). The
briber has a total bribe budget Q. The goal of the briber is to
make the designated candidate win the election. The bribery
problem has been extensively investigated in the literature; see,
for example, Faliszewski et al. (2009a); Lin (2010); Brelsford
et al. (2008); Xia (2012); Faliszewski et al. (2015); Parkes and
Xia (2012).
BVU (Election with Bribed Voter Uncertainty): A new
problem. As discussed before, we introduce and study a novel
variant of the classic bribery problem. Suppose voter vi takes a
bribe of amount qi from the briber. With probability pi ∈ [0,1],
which is independent of anything else, the vote of vi goes to the
designated candidate and is counted; with probability 1− pi,
the vote of vi is not counted (for the two reasons mentioned
above), that is, no candidate will receive the vote from vi.
Without loss of generality, let c1 be the winner when there is
no bribery and cm be the briber’s designated candidate. Let
Vj be the subset of voters that vote for candidate c j in the
absence of bribery, then |V1| > |Vj| for any j > 1. Moreover,
let r = |V1|− |Vm|, namely the difference between the number
of votes received by the winner c1 and the number of votes
received by the designated candidate cm in the absence of
bribery. The BVU problem asks for a subset of voters in
V \Vm whose total price is bounded by Q such that if they are
bribed, the probability that the designated candidate cm wins
is maximized, while noting that the voters in Vm do not need
to be bribed because they already vote for cm. More precisely,
the BVU problem is formalized as follows,
The (Plurality-)BVU Problem
Input: A set of m candidates C = {c1,c2, . . . ,cm}, where
c1 is the winner and cm is the designated candidate in the
absence of bribery; a set of n voters V = {v1,v2, · · · ,vn}
with V = ∪mj=1Vj, where Vj is the subset of voters that vote
for c j in the absence of bribery; a positive integer r = |V1|−
|Vm|; the briber’s budget Q; each vi is associated with a price
qi for bribe and a probability pi with which the vote of the
bribed voter vi goes to the designated candidate cm and is
counted (i.e., 1− pi is the probability that the vote of the
bribed vi is not counted)
Output: Find a set of indices I∗ ⊆ {1,2, · · · ,n} such that
• ∑i∈I∗ qi ≤ Q, and
• the probability that the designated candidate cm wins is
maximized by bribing voters in V ′= {vi ∈V \Vm|i∈ I∗}
a) Preliminaries.: Let Z be a random variable taking
non-negative values. The Markov’s inequality (see, for exam-
ple, Stein and Shakarchi (2009)) says the following: For any
a> 0, it holds that
Pr(Z ≥ a)≤ E(Z)
a
. (1)
Theorem 1 (Berry-Essen theorem; see Berry (1941)). Let
Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn be independent random variables with E(Zi)= 0,
E(Z2i ) = σ2i > 0, and E(|Zi|3) = ρi < ∞. Let
Sn =
Z1+Z2+ . . .+Zn√
σ21 +σ
2
2 + . . .+σ2n
.
Then, it holds that
sup
x∈R
|Fn(x)−Φ(x)| ≤C0 ·ψ0, (2)
where C0 is a universal constant, Fn(x) is the cumulative
distribution function of Sn, Φ(x) is the standard normal
distribution N (0,1), and
ψ0 =
( n
∑
i=1
σ2i
)−3/2 · n∑
i=1
ρi.
The following Proposition 1 is a folklore.
Proposition 1. Let Y1,Y2,Z1,Z2 be independent random vari-
ables taking values in Z≥0 (i.e., non-negative integers) such
that for any integer 0≤ h≤ N the following hold:
Pr(Y1 ≥ h)≥ (1−δ )Pr(Z1 ≥ h),
Pr(Y2 ≥ h)≥ (1−δ )Pr(Z2 ≥ h).
Then, for any 0≤ `≤ N, we have:
Pr(Y1+Y2 ≥ `)≥ (1−δ )2 Pr(Z1+Z2 ≥ `).
Proof. For any integer 0≤ `≤ N, we have
Pr(Y1+Y2 ≥ `)
=
`−1
∑
j=0
Pr(Y1 = j)Pr(Y2 ≥ `− j)+Pr(Y1 ≥ `)
≥ (1−δ )[
`−1
∑
j=0
Pr(Y1 = j)Pr(Z2 ≥ `− j)+Pr(Y1 ≥ `)]
≥ (1−δ )Pr(Y1+Z2 ≥ `).
Similarly, we can prove that
Pr(Y1+Z2 ≥ `)≥ (1−δ )Pr(Z1+Z2 ≥ `).
Hence, Pr(Y1+Y2 ≥ `)≥ (1−δ )2 Pr(Z1+Z2 ≥ `).
Proposition 1 can be re-written additively as follows.
Corollary 1. Let Y1,Y2,Z1,Z2 be independent random vari-
ables taking values in Z≥0 such that for any integer 0≤ h≤ `,
the following hold:
Pr(Y1 ≥ h)≥ Pr(Z1 ≥ h)−δ ,
Pr(Y2 ≥ h)≥ Pr(Z2 ≥ h)−δ .
Then, we have:
Pr(Y1+Y2 ≥ `)≥ Pr(Z1+Z2 ≥ `)−2δ .
By iteratively applying Corollary 1 to a sequence of inde-
pendent random variables, we obtain the following corollary
that will be used later.
Corollary 2. Let Yj,Z j, 1≤ j≤m, be 2m independent random
variables taking values in Z≥0 such that for any integer 0 ≤
h≤ ` and 1≤ j ≤ m, the following holds:
Pr(Yj ≥ h)≥ (1−δ )Pr(Z j ≥ h)−δ
Then, we have:
Pr
(
m
∑
j=1
Yj ≥ `
)
≥ (1−δ )m Pr
(
m
∑
j=1
Z j ≥ `
)
−mδ .
III. HARDNESS OF THE BVU PROBLEM
We show the hardness of the BVU problem for m = 2. By
introducing dummy voters whose prices are higher than the
briber’s budget Q (i.e., they cannot be bribed), the hardness
result immediately applies to the case of an arbitrary m> 2.
A. Hardness Result
The goal of this subsection is to prove the following.
Theorem 2 (Main hardness result). Assuming W [1] 6= FPT ,
there does not exist an O(1)-approximation algorithm for BVU
problem that runs in FPT time parameterized by r, even if
m = 2. Moreover, assuming P 6= NP, there does not exist an
O(1)-approximation algorithm for the BVU problem that runs
in polynomial time if r is part of the input, even if m = 2.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we leverage the equivalence
between the BVU problem with m = 2 and the following
Knapsack with Uncertainty (KU) problem.
Knapsack with Uncertainty (KU)
Input: A knapsack of capacity Q; a set of n′ items, with
each item associated with a size qi and a profit Pi, which is
an independent random variable such that Pr(Pi = 1) = pi
and Pr(Pi = 0) = 1− pi; a positive integer r.
Output: Find a set of indices I∗ ⊆ {1,2, · · · ,n} such that
• ∑i∈I∗ qi ≤ Q, and
• Pr(∑i∈I∗ Pi ≥ r+1−|I∗|) is maximized.
Lemma 1. The BVU problem with m = 2 is equivalent to the
KU problem.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the BVU problem with m = 2.
Recall that c1 is the winner in the absence of bribery, c2 is
the designated candidate, r = |V1|−|V2|, and the problem is to
bribe a set V ′= {vi ∈V1|i∈ I∗} of voters so that the probability
c2 wins is maximized.
Consider the number of votes received by candidates c1 and
c2 after the briber bribes the voters in V ′. For a bribed voter
vi ∈V ′, there are two possibilities:
• The vote of vi is counted, meaning the number of votes
received by candidate c1 decreases by 1 and the number
of votes received by candidate c2 increases by 1.
• The vote of vi is not counted, meaning the number of
votes received by c1 decreases by 1 but the number of
votes received by c2 remains the same.
This means that the votes received by candidate c1 de-
creases to |V1| − |V ′|. Hence, for c2 to win, it needs at least
|V1| − |V ′|+ 1 votes. Given that c2 originally receives |V2|
votes, at least |V1| − |V ′| − |V2|+ 1 = r− |I∗|+ 1 votes from
the bribed voters are counted. Let Xi be a binary random
variable indicating whether the vote of vi is counted, then
Pr(Xi = 1) = pi and Pr(Xi = 0) = 1− pi. The probability that
at least r− |I∗|+ 1 votes of the bribed voters are counted
is Pr(∑i∈I∗ Xi ≥ r+1−|I∗|). That is, the BVU problem with
m= 2 essentially asks for an index set I∗ such that ∑i∈I∗ qi≤Q
and Pr(∑i∈I∗ Xi ≥ r+1−|I∗|) is maximized. This is exactly
the KU problem.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we also need:
Theorem 3. Assuming W [1] 6= FPT , there does not exist an
O(1)-approximation algorithm for the KU problem that runs
in FPT time parameterized by r.
Proof of Theorem 3. We leverage the d-sum problem, which
is known to be W [1]-hard (see Downey and Fellows (1992)),
and show a reduction from the d-sum problem to the KU
problem. We first review the d-sum problem.
The d-sum Problem
Input: s positive integer x1,x2, · · · ,xs and an integer t.
Output: Decide whether or not there exists a subset E ⊆
{x1,x2, · · · ,xs} of |E|= d elements such that ∑i:xi∈E xi = t.
The rest is to show the following reduction: If there is
an α-approximation algorithm that solves the KU problem
in f (r)nO(1) time for some computable function f and some
constant α , then this algorithm can be used to solve the d-sum
problem in f (d)mO(1) time. This contradicts the W [1]-hardness
result of the d-sum problem mentioned above (Downey and
Fellows (1995)).
The details of the reduction follow. Given an instance of
the d-sum problem with s integers x1,x2, · · · ,xs, we construct
an instance of the KU problem as follows. Let n′ = s and
r = 2d−1. Construct n′ items in the KU problem with pi =
Pr(Pi = 1) = 2−ωxi and qi = M−ωxi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
ω = dlog2αe+1 and M = sω∑si=1 xi. Let Q = dM−ωt. We
make two claims.
Claim 1. If the d-sum instance admits a solution, then there
exists a solution to the KU problem with an objective value at
least 2−ωt .
Proof. Suppose the d-sum problem admits a solution E. Let
I = {i|xi ∈ E} be the index set of items in the solution. We
observe that
∑
i∈I
qi = dM−ω∑
i∈I
xi = dM−ωt = Q, and
Pr
(
∑
i∈I
Pi ≥ d
)
= Pr(Pi = 1,∀i ∈ I) =∏
i∈I
pi = 2−ωt .
Hence, there exists a solution with an objective value at least
2−ωt . Thus, Claim 1 holds.
Claim 2. If the d-sum instance does not admit a solution, then
any solution to the KU problem has an objective value at most
2−ω(t+1) < 1/α ·2−ωt .
Proof. Suppose the d-sum problem does not admit a solution.
Note that for any solution I to the KU problem, we have |I| ≤
d; otherwise, |I| ≥ d+1 leads to
∑
i∈I
qi ≥ (d+1)M−ω∑
i∈I
xi > dM > Q,
which contradicts that I is a solution. We split |I| ≤ d into two
scenarios: |I| ≤ d−1 or |I|= d.
• In the case |I| ≤ d−1, Claim 2 holds because
Pr
(
∑
i∈I
Pi ≥ r+1−|I|
)
≤ Pr
(
∑
i∈I
Pi ≥ d+1
)
= 0< 2−ω(t+1).
• In the case |I|= d, the fact ∑i∈I qi ≤Q and qi =M−ωxi
and Q = dM−ωt implies ∑i∈I xi ≥ t. Since the d-sum
problem does not admit a solution, either ∑i∈I xi≥ t+1 or
∑i:xi∈I xi ≤ t−1. Given that ∑i∈I xi ≥ t, we have ∑i∈I xi ≥
t+1. Then, Claim 2 holds because
Pr
(
∑
i∈I
Pi ≥ d
)
=∏
i∈I
pi = 2−ω∑i∈I xi ≤ 2−ω(t+1).
Under Claims 1-2, we observe that an α-approximation
algorithm for the KU problem can be used to solve the d-sum
problem as follows:
• In the case the α-approximation algorithm for the KU
porblem returns a feasible solution with an objective value
that is ≤ 2−ω(t+1), the optimal objective value is at most
α · 2−ω(t+1) < 2−ωt . Claim 1 implies that the d-sum
instance does not admit a feasible solution.
• In the case the α-approximation algorithm for the KU
problem returns a feasible solution with an objective
value that is > 2−ω(t+1), Claim 2 implies that the d-sum
instance must admit a feasible solution.
Hence, any α-approximation algorithm for solving the KU
problem can be used to solve the d-sum problem. This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary 3. Assuming P 6=NP, there does not exist an O(1)-
approximation algorithm for the KU problem that runs in
polynomial time if r is part of the input.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 1 shows that the KU problem
is equivalent to the BVU problem with two candidates. The
hardness of the KU problem is established by Theorem 3 and
Corollary 3. Hence Theorem 2 holds.
IV. AN APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM IN FPT TIME
Having showed that the BVU problem is hard, now we
present an approximation algorithm for solving it. The algo-
rithm runs in FPT time for any fixed constant m and any small
constant ε . In terms of approximation ratio, our algorithm
returns a value that is ≥ OPT− ε , where OPT ∈ [0,1] is the
optimal objective value. Note that the hardness result given by
Theorem 2 suggests that an additive approximation algorithm
is perhaps the best algorithm we can hope for.
A. Algorithmic Result
Theorem 4 (Main algorithmic result). For an arbitrary small
constant ε > 0, there exists an algorithm for the BVU problem,
which runs in rO(mr/ε)+nO(m
5/ε5) time and returns a solution
with an objective value no smaller than OPT−ε , where OPT∈
[0,1] is the optimal objective value.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we need to design an approx-
imation algorithm for the BVU problem. For this purpose, we
define a new variant of the Knapsack problem.
The MKU Problem. The MKU problem deals with items
that have deterministic sizes but random profits and involves
a stochastic objective function, and the goal is to maximize
a certain “overflow” probability under the knapsack’s volume
and cardinality constraints. More specifically, the MKU prob-
lem is defined as follows:
Multi-block Knapsack with Uncertainty (MKU)
Input: A knapsack of capacity Q; a set of items V =
{v1,v2, · · · ,vn}, with each item associated with a size qi and
a profit Pi, which is an independent random variable such
that Pr(Pi = 1) = pi and Pr(Pi = 0) = 1− pi; a partition of
the n items into a constant m≥ 2 subsets V1,V2, · · · ,Vm, and
a quota ∆ j for each Vj such that ∆ j ≤ r+1 for some positive
integer r; a positive integer k such that k≤ r+1; a positive
index 1≤ j0 ≤ m−1.
Output: Find a set of indices I∗ ⊆ {1,2, · · · ,n} such that
• ∑i∈I∗ qi ≤ Q,
• |V (I∗)∩Vj| ≥ ∆ j for all 1≤ j ≤ m−1 and j 6= j0,
• |V (I∗)∩Vj0 |= ∆ j0 ,
• Pr(∑i∈I∗ Pi ≥ k) is maximized,
where V (I∗) = {vi|i ∈ I∗}.
Note that in the preceding definition, we intentionally make
the parameters of the MKU problem correspond to the pa-
rameters of the BVU problem exactly, because we intend to
reduce the number of notations used in this paper (for better
readability). That is, parameters n, m, Vj, Q, pi, qi, r and I∗ in
the BVU problem correspond to the same parameters in the
MKU problem. We will use the problem context to distinguish
the meanings of these parameters. Because of this, we say an
instance of the MKU problem corresponds to an instance of
the BVU problem when they have the same set of parameter
values.
Now we show that the BVU problem can be solved effi-
ciently by utilizing an algorithm for the MKU problem.
Theorem 5. Let ε > 0 be an arbitrary small constant. Denote
by OPTBVU and OPTMKU the optimal objective value of the
BVU problem and the MKU problem, respectively. A feasible
solution to the BVU problem with an objective value at least
OPTBVU − ε can be found in O(rmΛ) time, where Λ is the
time for finding a feasible solution to the corresponding MKU
problem with the objective value at least OPTMKU − ε .
Proof. Let I be an arbitrary solution to the BVU problem,
V (I) = {vi|i∈ I} and V ′j =Vj∩V (I). For any vi ∈V ′j , we define
X ji to be a binary random variable indicating whether vi votes
or not if it is bribed, i.e., Pr(X ji = 1) = pi and Pr(X
j
i = 0) =
1− pi.
For j = 1, . . . ,m−1, if vi ∈Vj is bribed (i.e., vi ∈V ′j ), then
there are two scenarios:
• The bribery succeeds, meaning that the number of votes
received by c j decreases by 1 and the number of votes
received by cm increases by 1.
• The bribery fails, meaning that the number of votes
received by c j decreases by 1 but the number of votes
received by cm remains unchanged.
Let Yj be the total number of votes received by c j after bribing.
Then, we have
Yj = |Vj|− |V ′j |, 1≤ j ≤ m−1;
Ym = |Vm|+ ∑
1≤ j≤m−1
∑
vi∈V ′j
X ji .
Note that Yj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 is a deterministic value,
rather than a random variable, because no matter the bribery
of vi ∈ V ′j succeeds or not, c j always loses the vote of vi.
The probability that the designated candidate cm becomes the
winner is:
Pr(Yj < Ym,1≤ j ≤ m−1)
= Pr
 ∑
1≤`≤m−1
∑
i:vi∈V ′`
X `i > |Vj|− |V ′j |− |Vm|,1≤ j ≤ m−1

= Pr
 ∑
1≤`≤m−1
∑
i:vi∈V ′`
X `i > max1≤ j≤m−1
(|Vj|− |V ′j |− |Vm|)
 .
We observe that this probability is only dependent on the
value of max
1≤ j≤m−1
(
|Vj|− |V ′j |− |Vm|
)
and that X ji ≥ 0 for 1≤
j≤m−1. If max
1≤ j≤m−1
(
|Vj|− |V ′j |− |Vm|
)
≤−1, then we have
Pr
 ∑
1≤ j≤m−1
∑
i:vi∈V ′j
X ji > max1≤ j≤m−1
(|Vj|− |V ′j |− |Vm|)

= Pr
 ∑
1≤ j≤m−1
∑
i:vi∈V ′j
X ji >−1
= 1.
For any solution I to the BVU problem, we define:
ξ (I) =

max
1≤ j≤m−1
(
|Vj|− |V ′j |− |Vm|
)
,
if max
1≤ j≤m−1
(
|Vj|− |V ′j |− |Vm|
)
≥ 0;
−1, otherwise
Then our previous arguments show that the BVU problem can
be reformulated as follows:
Find I∗ ⊆ {1,2, · · · ,n} such that ∑i∈I qi ≤ Q and
Pr
(
∑
1≤ j≤m−1
∑
i:vi∈∈V j∩V (I∗)
X ji ≥ ξ (I∗)+1
)
is maximized.
Recall that candidate c1 is the winner in the absence of
bribery and |Vm| = |V1|− r. Then, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ m−1, we
have |Vj| ≤ |Vm|+ r and therefore ξ (I) ≤ r for any feasible
solution I, leading to ξ (I)∈ {−1,0,1, · · · ,r}, and in particular
ξ (I∗) ∈ {−1,0,1, · · · ,r}. Hence, we can guess the value of
ξ (I∗). When we guess the value of ξ (I∗) correctly, say,
ξ (I∗) = α , then the BVU problem is equivalent to finding
some I∗ such that ∑i∈I∗ qi ≤ Q, ξ (I∗) = α and
Pr
 ∑
1≤ j≤m−1
∑
i:vi∈V ′j
X ji ≥ α+1

is maximized. By definition, ξ (I∗) = α holds if and only if
the following two conditions are simultaneously satisfied:
• Condition 1: There exists some j0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1} such
that |Vj0 |− |V ′j0 |− |Vm|= α .
• Condition 2: For any j ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, we have |Vj|−
|V ′j |− |Vm| ≤ α .
Let us define
∆ j =
{ |Vj|− |Vm|−α if |Vj|− |Vm|−α ≥ 0;
0 otherwise.
Then, the preceding Conditions 1 and 2 are equivalent to
|Vj0 ∩V (I)|= |V ′j0 |= ∆ j0 and |Vj ∩V (I)| ≥ ∆ j, respectively.
Hence, when we guess ξ (I∗) and j0 correctly, the BVU
problem is exactly the same as the MKU problem, whereas a
(near-)optimal solution to the MKU problem implies a (near-
)optimal solution to the BVU problem. Since guessing ξ (I∗)
and j0 takes O(rm) enumerations, we can solve the BVU
problem by having oracle access to an algorithm that solves
the MKU problem. Theorem 5 is proved.
Proof of Theorem 4. Theorem 5, which is stated and proven
below, shows that a (approximate) solution of the BVU
problem can be found in polynomial oracle-time, by utilizing a
(approximation) algorithm for the MKU problem as an oracle.
The remaining task is to design an approximate algorithm
for solving the MKU problem, which is quite involved and
suggests us to use the “divide and conquer” strategy by
considering two cases separately (Theorem 6).
Now we show that there is an approximate algorithm for
solving the MKU problem.
Theorem 6 (algorithm for solving the MKU problem). For
any arbitrary small constant ε > 0, there exists an algorithm
for the MKU problem that runs in rO(mr/ε)+nO(m
5/ε5) time and
returns a solution with an objective value that is no smaller
than OPT−ε , where OPT∈ [0,1] is the optimal objective value
in the MKU problem.
Proof of Theorem 4. By putting Theorem 5 and Theorem
6 together, we obtain Theorem 4.
B. The Proof of Theorem 6
The main difficulty originates from the maximization of
a probability involving the sum of random variables, which
does not have a simple explicit expression. A natural idea
is to approximate the summation of random variables with
a Gaussian variable via Berry-Essen’s Theorem. However,
such an approximation is not always achievable because the
condition in Berry-Essen’s Theorem does not necessarily hold.
Furthermore, even if Berry-Essen’s Theorem is applicable,
bounding the tail probability of a Gaussian variable together
with a set of other constraints required in MKP is still chal-
lenging. Figure 1 highlights the proof strategy for overcoming
these difficulties.
Theorem 6
Case 1: the optimal solution 
contains many big items 
(Lemma 2)
Case 2: the optimal solution 
does not contain many big items
Dealing with big items 
(Lemma 3)
Dealing with small items 
(Lemma 4)
Scenario 1: not so 
many small items 
(Lemma 5)
Scenario 2: many 
small items 
(Lemmas 6-8)
Fig. 1: Strategy for proving Theorem 6.
Specifically, We partition the set of items into big and small
ones based on their probability. Then, we differentiate the
case that the optimal solution contains many big items (Case
1), which is easily coped with by using Markov’s inequality
(Lemma 2), from the case that the optimal solution does not
contain many big items (Case 2), whose treatment is much
more complicated and proceeds as follows.
• First, we apply Corollary 2 to decompose the MKU
problem in Case 2 into a series of sub-problems, each
of which is a stochastic knapsack problem with one
cardinality constraint.
• Second, for big items (Lemma 3), we round their prob-
ability to O(k/ε) ≤ O(r/ε) distinct probabilities. This
allows us to guess the number of big items corresponding
to the rounded probabilities in the optimal solution,
leading to the selection of the optimal subset of big items.
• Third, for small items (Lemma 4), there are two scenar-
ios:
– In the scenario where the optimal solution does not
contain a large volume of small items, we present a
dynamic programming algorithm (Lemma 5).
– In the scenario where the optimal solution contains a
large volume of small items, Berry-Essen’s Theorem
is applicable and we can use it to transform the prob-
lem of maximizing a specific probability to the prob-
lem of approximating the summation of moments
of random variables in the optimal solution. Since
the moments of a random variable are deterministic,
we can leverage the technique for solving the classic
knapsack problem (Lemmas 6-8).
Definition 1 (big vs. small items). Under the assumption that
ε > 0 is a small constant such that 1/ε ≥ 4 is an integer, we
say an item in the MKU problem is big if pi > 1− ε2 and is
small otherwise.
Lemma 2 (the case the optimal solution containing many
big items). If |T ∩B j∗ | ≥ 2k, then there is a polynomial-time
algorithm that returns a solution I to the MKU problem such
that
• ∑i∈I qi ≤ Q,
• |V (I)∩Vj| ≥ ∆ j for j 6= j0,
• |V (I)∩Vj0 |= ∆ j0 , and
• Pr(∑i∈I Pi ≥ k)≥ 1− ε .
Proof. We first select the 2k big items with the smallest sizes
within B j∗ . Among the remaining items in each Vj, we further
select the items of the smallest size to make sure that we have
selected at least ∆ j items in each Vj and exact ∆ j0 items in
Vj0 – this can be achieved by a simple greedy strategy, that is,
we check if there is any j such that the cardinality constraint
is not satisfied yet, and pick items of smallest size in Vj to
ensure the cardinality constraint. Let I be the set of items that
are selected as such, then obviously we have |I∩Vj| ≥ ∆ j and
|I∩Vj0 |= ∆ j0 . Since we always select the smallest items, we
have ∑i∈I qi ≤ Q. That is, the first three conditions required
by Lemma 2 are satisfied.
In what follows we show the last condition, namely
Pr(∑i∈I Pi ≥ k)≥ 1− ε . Let Xi = 1−Pi and µ = E(∑i∈I Xi)≤
2kε2. By applying Markov’s inequality Eq. (1), we have
Pr(PI < k) = Pr
(
∑
i∈I
Xi ≥ k+1
)
≤ Pr
(
∑
i∈I
Xi ≥ µ · 12ε2
)
≤ 2ε2.
Hence, Pr(PI ≥ k) ≥ 1− ε . The completes the proof of the
Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 (dealing with big items in the case the optimal
solution not containing many big items). If |T ∩B`| ≤ 2k−1,
then there is an algorithm that runs in kO(mk/ε) ≤ rO(mr/ε) time
and returns a set I∩B` of big items such that
• |I∩B`|= |T ∩B`|,
• QI∩B` ≤ QT∩B` , and
• Pr(PI∩B` ≥ h)≥ (1−2ε/m)Pr(PT∩B` ≥ h) for any h≥ 0.
Proof. We round the probabilities associated to the big items
as follows. Let δ = ε/(mk) and β = O(1/δ ) = O(mk/ε) be
the largest integer such that (1− ε2)(1+δ )β < 1. Let
Γ1 = {1− ε2,(1− ε2)(1+δ ), . . . ,(1− ε2)(1+δ )β}
be the set of rounded probabilities. For each big item, we
round its probability pi down to the nearest value in Γ1 and
denote it by p˜i. Note that p˜i ≤ pi < p˜i(1+δ ). Let Bs` be the
subset of big items such that their associated probabilities are
rounded to (1− ε2)(1+δ )s.
For each `≤O(k/ε), we guess the value of |T ∩Bs`| ≤O(k).
There are at most kO(mk/ε) different possibilities on these
values. Once we guess |T ∩Bs`| correctly for each `, we select
the |T ∩Bs`| items that have the smallest size in Bs` and let B¯s`
denote the set of these items. Set I∩B` = ∪βs=0B¯s`.
Now we prove that I∩B` defined above satisfies Lemma 3,
whereas the lemma is proved. For this purpose, we first
observe that |I ∩ Bs`| = |T ∩ Bs`| and I ∩ Bs` always consists
of the items with the smallest size in Bs`, therefore we
have QI∩B` ≤ QT∩B` . Then, we compare Pr(PI∩B` = h) and
Pr(PT∩B` = h) for every h ≥ 0. Let φ be an arbitrary one-to-
one mapping that maps each item in T ∩B` to a distinct item
in I∩B` for every j. We have
Pr(PT∩B` = h) = ∑
I⊆T∩B`,|I|=h
∏
i∈I
pi∏
i6∈I
(1− pi),
Pr(PI∩B` = h) = ∑
I⊆T∩B`,|I|=h
∏
i∈I
pφ(i)∏
i 6∈I
(1− pφ(i)).
In order to show Pr(PI∩B` = h)≥ (1−2ε/m)Pr(PT∩B` = h), it
suffices to show that
∏
i∈I
pφ(i)∏
i6∈I
(1− pφ(i))≥ (1−2ε/m)∏
i∈I
pi∏
i6∈I
(1− pi)
for every I ⊆ T ∩B` with |I| = h. According to the way we
round probabilities, we have pφ(i) ≤ pi < pφ(i)(1+ δ ), hence
1− pφ(i) ≥ 1− pi and
∏
i∈I
pφ(i) ≥ (1−δ )h∏
i∈I
pi ≥ (1−hδ )∏
i∈I
pi.
For h≤ 2k, we have hδ ≤ 2ε/m and
Pr(PI∩B` = h)≥ (1−2ε/m)Pr(PT∩B` = h).
For h > 2k, Pr(PT∩B` = h) = 0 and the above inequality is
trivially true.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 (dealing with small items in the case the optimal
solution not containing many big items). There exists an
algorithm that runs in nO(m
5/ε5) time and returns a feasible
solution I∩S` such that
• |I∩S`|= |T ∩S`|
• QI∩S` ≤ QT∩S`
• Pr(PI∩S` ≥ h)≥ Pr(PT∩S` ≥ h)−Θ(ε/m)
The proof of this lemma needs a sequence of results.
Lemma 5. For any ζ , there exists an algorithm that runs in
(mn/ε)O(ζ ) time and returns a solution I ∩ S` such that |I ∩
S`|= |T ∩S`|, QI∩S` ≤ QT∩S` and Pr(PI∩S` = h)≤ Pr(PT∩S` =
h)+2ε/(mn) for every 0≤ h≤ ζ −1.
Proof of Lemma 5. We design an algorithm based on dy-
namic programming. Let η = ε/(mn2). Although we do not
know the value of Pr(PT∩S` = h), we know that this value
lies in [0,1]. Therefore, we can guess, via (mn/ε)O(ζ ) enu-
merations, the ζ values t0, t1, · · · , tζ−1 such that th−ε/(mn)≤
Pr(PT∩S` = h)< th. In the following we provide an algorithm
that returns I ∩S` such that Pr(PI∩S` = h) ≤ th + ε/(mn), and
Lemma 5 follows.
Let us define Γ2 = {0,η ,2η , . . . ,η · 1/η} as the set
of rounded probabilities. Let us call a (ζ + 2)-vector
( j,ϖ ,u0,u1,u2, . . . ,uζ−1) a state, where j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n′}, ϖ ∈
{0,1, · · · ,n′} and u j ∈ Γ2. Each state is associated with a
positive value f ( j,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1), which can be calcu-
lated recursively as shown in the next paragraph. Intuitively,
a state means that a subset U ⊆ {1,2, . . . , j} of items can be
selected such that Pr(PU = j) is approximately u j, |U | = ϖ
and f ( j,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1) is the minimal total size of items
among all possible subsets U . In particular, if such a subset
U does not exist, then f ( j,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1) = ∞.
Now we define the calculation of f ( j,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1).
For this purpose, we first define the summation of state
( j,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1) and random variable Pj+1 as follows:
( j,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)+Pj+1
= ( j+1,ϖ +1, u˜′0, u˜
′
1, . . . , u˜
′
ζ−1), (4)
where u˜′j is the nearest value in Γ2 when rounding up u′j with
u′0 = u0(1− p j+1) and u′j = u j(1− ph+1)+u j−1 ph for 1≤ j≤
ζ −1.
Initially, for j = 0, we define
f (0,0,0, . . . ,0) = 0 (5)
and for (u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1) 6= (0,0, . . . ,0), we define
f (0,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1) = ∞. (6)
For h≥ 0, we define
g( j+1,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1) =
q j+1+min{ f ( j,ϖ ′,u′0,u′1, . . . ,u′ζ−1) :
( j,ϖ ′,u′0,u
′
1, . . . ,u
′
ζ−1)+Pj+1 = ( j+1,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)},
and define
f ( j+1,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1) =
min{ f ( j,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1),g( j+1,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)}. (7)
Observe that we can use Eqs. (5)-(7) to recursively calculate
the value associated to any state. Since the total number of
states is bounded from above by |Γ2|O(ζ ) = (mn/ε)O(ζ ), the
calculation can be done in polynomial time. In the following
we show that, among all of the states (n,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)
that satisfy f (n,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1) ≤ Q, there exists some
state (n,ϖ∗,u∗0,u
∗
1, . . . ,u
∗
ζ−1) such that ϖ
∗ = |T ∩ S`| and
u∗h ≤ th + ε/(mn). Denote the set of items selected in the
corresponding solution by I∩S`, then I∩S` satisfies Lemma 5.
Consider the optimal solution T ∩S`. Let Tj = T ∩S` ∩
{1,2, . . . , j} and ui(Tj) = Pr(PTj = i). We make the following
claim.
Claim 3. For any 0 ≤ j ≤ n′, there exists a vector
( j,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1) such that
• ϖ = |Tj|
• f ( j,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)≤ QTj , and
• ui ≤ ui(Tj)+ jη for every 0≤ i≤ ζ −1.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction. It is trivial to see that
the claim holds when j = 0. Suppose the claim holds for j≤ s.
That is, for j= s, there exists some state (s,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)
such that ui ≤ ui(Ts) + sη for every 0 ≤ i ≤ ζ − 1 and
f (s,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)≤ QTs .
Now we prove it holds for j = s+1. There are two cases:
s+1 6∈ Ts+1 and s+1 ∈ Ts+1.
In the case s+1 6∈ Ts+1, we have QTs+1 =QTs and ui(Ts+1) =
ui(Ts). According to Equation (7), we have
f (s+1,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)
≤ f (s,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)≤ QTs = QTs+1 ,
hence the claim holds.
In the case s+1 ∈ Ts+1, we have
u0(Ts+1) = u0(Ts)ps+1, (8)
ui(Ts+1) = ui(Ts)(1− ps+1)+ui−1(Ts)ps+1,1≤ i≤ ζ −1. (9)
Compare Eqs. (8)-(9) with (7), we see that if
(s+1,ϖ ′,u′0,u
′
1, . . . ,u
′
ζ−1) = (s,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)+Ps+1,
then
u′0 ≤ u0(1− ps+1)+η ≤ u0(Ts+1)+(s+1)η ,
and
u′i ≤ ui(1− ps+1)+ui−1 ps+1+η
≤ ui(Ts)(1− ps+1)+ui−1(Ts)ps+1+(s+1)η
= ui(Ts+1)+(s+1)η .
Furthermore, we have
f (s+1,ϖ ′,u′0,u
′
1, . . . ,u
′
ζ−1)
≤ f (s,ϖ ,u0,u1, . . . ,uζ−1)+qs+1 ≤ QTs+1 .
Hence, Claim 3 holds.
Claim 3 says that there exists a state (n,ϖ∗,u∗0,u
∗
1, . . . ,u
∗
ζ−1)
such that f (n,ϖ∗,u∗0,u
∗
1, . . . ,u
∗
ζ−1) ≤ Q, ϖ∗ = |T ∩ S`| and
u∗i ≤ ui(Tn′)+n′η ≤ ui(T ∩S`)+ε/(mn). Since in the recursive
calculation we always overestimate (by rounding up) the
probabilities, we have
Pr(PI∩S` = h)≤ u∗h ≤ Pr(PT∩S` = h)+ ε/(mn)≤ th+ ε/(mn).
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Definition 2. For any subset D of small items and integer
h≥ 0, we define
hˆD =
h−∑i∈D pi√
∑i∈Dσ2i
=
h−∑i∈D pi√
∑i∈D pi(1− pi)
.
The proofs of the following two lemmas mainly consist of
mathematical calculations together with a suitable application
of Berry-Essen’s theorem.
Lemma 6. If
∑
i∈I∩S`
pi > (m/ε)4 and |Φ(hˆI∩S`)−Φ(hˆT∩S`)| ≤ O(ε/m),
then
Pr
(
∑
i∈I∩S`
Pi ≥ h
)
≥ Pr
(
∑
i∈T∩S`
Pi ≥ h
)
−Ω(ε/m),
where Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution.
Proof. We define random variable Xi = Pi−E(Pi) = Pi− pi,
then E(Xi) = 0,
σ2i = E(X2i ) = (1− pi)2 pi+ p2i (1− pi) = pi(1− pi),
ρi = E(|Xi|3) = pi(1− pi)[p2i +(1− pi)2].
We have
Pr
(
∑
i∈I∩S`
Pi ≥ h
)
= Pr
 ∑i∈I∩S` Xi√
∑i∈I∩S` σ
2
i
≥ hˆI∩S`
 .
According to Berry-Essen’s theorem (2), we have∣∣∣∣∣Pr
(
∑
i∈I∩S`
Pi ≥ h
)
− (1−Φ(hˆI∩S`))
∣∣∣∣∣≤C0 · ∑i∈I∩S` ρi(∑i∈I∩S` σ2i )3/2 .
By plugging in ρi and σi, we have∣∣Pr(∑i∈I∩S` Pi ≥ h)− (1−Φ(hˆI∩S`))∣∣≤C0 · 1√∑i∈I∩S` pi(1−pi) .
For small items, it holds that 1− pi ≥ ε2. Since ∑i∈I∩S` pi >
(m/ε)4, we have∣∣∣∣∣Pr
(
∑
i∈I∩S`
Pi ≥ h
)
− (1−Φ(hˆI∩S`))
∣∣∣∣∣≤C0ε/m.
Hence, the probability Pr
(
∑i∈I∩S` Pi ≥ h
)
can be estimated
using the standard normal distribution Φ(hˆI∩S`). More specif-
ically, if we can select I∩S` such that
|Φ(hˆI∩S`)−Φ(hˆT∩S`)| ≤ O(ε/m)
for every 0≤ h≤ k, then it holds that
Pr
(
∑
i∈I∩S`
Pi ≥ h
)
≥ (1−Φ(hˆI∩S`))−C0ε/m
=
(
1−Φ(hˆT∩S`)
)−Ω(ε/m)
≥ Pr
(
∑
i∈T∩S`
Pi ≥ h
)
−Ω(ε/m).
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 7. If
∑
i∈T∩S`
pi > (m/ε)4
and the following holds for some I∩S`:
• |∑i∈I∩S` pi−∑i∈T∩S` pi| ≤ O(ε/m), and
• |∑i∈I∩S` pi(1− pi)−∑i∈T∩S` pi(1− pi)| ≤ O(ε/m),
then
|Φ(hˆI∩S`)−Φ(hˆT∩S`)| ≤ O(ε/m)
for every 0≤ h≤ k.
Proof. Note that
∣∣∑i∈I∩S` pi(1− pi)−∑i∈T∩S` pi(1− pi)∣∣ ≤
ε/m and ∑i∈T∩S` pi > (m/ε)
4. We define
β1 =
√
∑i∈I∩S` pi(1− pi)
∑i∈T∩S` pi(1− pi)
∈ [1− ε/m,1+ ε/m],
β2 = ∑
i∈I∩S`
pi− ∑
i∈T∩S`
pi ∈ [−ε/m,ε/m].
Then, we have
hˆI∩S` =
h−∑i∈I∩S` pi√
∑i∈I∩S` pi(1− pi)
=
1
β1
· h−∑i∈T∩S` pi−β2√
∑i∈T∩S` pi(1− pi)
=
1
β1
· hˆT∩S` +O(ε/m).
Using the result of Claim 4 below, we obtain
|Φ(hˆI∩S`)−Φ(hˆT∩S`)| ≤ O(ε/m),
meaning Lemma 7 holds.
Claim 4. For any x ∈ (−∞,∞) and δ > 0, it holds that
|Φ((1+δ )x±δ )−Φ(x)| ≤ 2δ .
Proof. We observe that for any y ∈ (−∞,∞), it holds that
|Φ(y±δ )−Φ(y)|=
∣∣∣∣∫ y±δy 1√2pi e−t2/2dt
∣∣∣∣≤ ∣∣∣∣∫ y±δy 1dt
∣∣∣∣= δ .
Now we show
|Φ((1+δ )x)−Φ(x)|=
∣∣∣∣∫ x+δxx 1√2pi e−t2/2dt
∣∣∣∣≤ δ .
We observe that because of the symmetry in x ∈ (−∞,∞), it
suffices to prove the above inequality for x ≥ 0. In this case,
we have e−t2/2 ≤ 1/t for t ≥ 0. (This is because the derivative
of te−t2/2 is et2/2(1−t2), and consequently its maximum value
is 1/
√
e≤ 1.) Therefore, we have∣∣∣∣∫ x+δxx 1√2pi e−t2/2dt
∣∣∣∣≤ δx ·1/x = δ
for x≥ 0. Hence, Claim 4 holds.
This completes the proof of Lemma 7.
Now we can replace the condition of Pr(PI∩S` ≥ h) ≥
Pr(PT∩S` ≥ h)−Θ(ε/m) in Lemma 4 with the conditions in
Lemma 7, leading to the following lemma whose proof is
based on a dynamic programming approach similar to that of
Lemma 5.
Lemma 8. If ∑i∈T∩S` pi > (m/ε)
4, then there exists an al-
gorithm that runs in O(m2n5/ε2) time and returns a feasible
solution with item set I∩S` such that
• QI∩S` ≤ QT∩S` , and
• |I∩S`|= |T ∩S`|, and
• |∑i∈I∩S` pi−∑i∈T∩S` pi| ≤ O(ε/m), and
• |∑i∈I∩S` pi(1− pi)−∑i∈T∩S` pi(1− pi)| ≤ O(ε/m).
Proof of Lemma 4. Without loss of generality we assume
S` = {1,2, · · · ,n′}. Recall that S` consists of small items. For
any small item vi we have ε2≤ 1− pi≤ 1. We prove Lemma 4
by considering the following two scenarios:
• Scenario 1: ∑i∈T∩S` pi ≤ (m/ε)4.
• Scenario 2: ∑i∈T∩S` pi > (m/ε)
4.
In Scenario 1, we observe that by Markov’s inequality Eq.(1),
we know
Pr(PT∩S` ≥ h)≤ ε/m for h≥ (m/ε)5.
Let ζ = (m/ε)5. Lemma 5 showed that we can find a subset
I∩S` of items in polynomial time such that
Pr(PI∩S` = h)≤ Pr(PT∩S` = h)+2ε/(mn)
holds for every 0≤ h≤ ζ −1. Then
Pr(PI∩S` ≥ h)≥ Pr(PT∩S` ≥ h)−2ε/m
for every 0≤ h≤ ζ −1. Since
Pr(PI∩S` ≥ h)≥ 0≥ Pr(PT∩S` ≥ h)−2ε/m
for h≥ ζ , we find a near-optimal solution I∩S` in polynomial
time. Hence, Lemma 4 holds in Scenario 1.
In Scenario 2, we have ∑i∈T∩S` pi > (m/ε)
4. As highlighted
before, the difficulty encountered here is to maximize the
probability with respect to the sum of random variables. Our
strategy is to first replace the condition
Pr(PI∩S` ≥ h)≥ Pr(PT∩S` ≥ h)−Θ(ε/m) (10)
in Lemma 4 with a stronger, but handier condition. More
precisely, by Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, we show that Eq (10)
is true if we have |∑i∈I∩S` pi −∑i∈T∩S` pi| ≤ O(ε/m), and|∑i∈I∩S` pi(1− pi)−∑i∈T∩S` pi(1− pi)| ≤ O(ε/m), plus some
cardinality constraints. Note that these knapsack-like con-
straints are much easier to handle when compared with
Eq (10). We will design a dynamic programming based
algorithm that finds a feasible solution with respect to these
stronger but handier conditions (Lemma 8). Thus, Lemma 4
holds in Scenario 2.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let T be the set of indices of items
that are selected by the optimal solution to the MKU problem,
and OPTMKU = Pr(∑i∈T Pi ≥ k) be the optimal objective value
given by the optimal solution. For any I (i.e., the indices of
the items that are selected by an approximation algorithm), we
define PI = ∑i∈I Pi and QI = ∑i∈I qi. Denote by S the set of
indices of small items and B the set of indices of big items. Let
B j = {i|i ∈ B,vi ∈Vj} and S j = {i|i ∈ S,vi ∈Vj}. According to
the number of big items selected by the optimal solution in
each Vj, namely |T ∩B j|, we divide the MKU problem into
the following two cases:
• Case 1: There exists some 1 ≤ j∗ ≤ m such that |T ∩
B j∗ | ≥ 2k.
• Case 2: |T ∩B j| ≤ 2k−1 for every 1≤ j ≤ m.
In Case 1, as 1 ≤ j∗ ≤ m, we can guess j∗ by O(m)
enumerations. When the guess of j∗ is correct, Theorem 6
is proven as Lemma 2.
In Case 2, we have |T ∩B j| ≤ 2k−1 for every j. We first
guess the values of |T ∩B j| and |T ∩S j| for all j, leading to
nO(m) enumerations. For the correct guess, Corollary 2 says
that a near optimal solution I can be found when the following
conditions are satisfied simultaneously:
• |I∩B j|= |T ∩B j| and |I∩S j|= T ∩S j|.
• QI∩B j ≤ QT∩B j and QI∩S j ≤ QT∩S j .
• For δ =Θ(ε/m) and any 0≤ h≤ k, we have
Pr(PI∩S j ≥ h) ≥ (1−δ )Pr(PT∩S j ≥ h)−δ , (11a)
Pr(PI∩B j ≥ h) ≥ (1−δ )Pr(PT∩B j ≥ h)−δ .(11b)
This means that we can decompose the MKU problem in Case
2 into a sequence of sub-problems, each of which asks for a
near optimal solution I ∩B j or I ∩ S j. Let 1 ≤ ` ≤ m be an
arbitrary index. Then, Theorem 6 in Case 2 is proven as
Lemma 3 (dealing with big items) and Lemma 4 (dealing
with small items).
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have introduced the BVU problem with the uncertainty
that the vote of a bribed voter may not be counted (either
because the bribed voter does not cast its vote in fear of being
caught, or because the bribed voter is indeed caught and its
vote is discarded). We have showed that the BVU problem
does not admit any multiplicative O(1)-approximation algo-
rithm in FPT time modulo standard complexity assumptions.
We have also showed that there is an algorithm that returns an
approximate solution with an additive-ε error in FPT time for
any arbitrary small ε . Given the hardness result, this algorithm
is perhaps the best one can hope for.
The BVU problem has many interesting aspects that deserve
further studies. First, our algorithmic result assumes a constant
number of candidates. Future work needs to characterize the
hardness of, and design approximate algorithms for, the BVU
problem when the number of candidates is part of the input
(rather than a constant). The problem with an arbitrary number
of candidates may be strictly harder than that of a constant
number of candidates. It is not clear whether or not our
approximation algorithm, which works for a constant number
of candidates, can be extended to cope with the case of an
arbitrary number of candidates. Moreover, the hardness of the
BVU problem (with both a constant and an arbitrary number
of candidates) needs to be investigated with respect to other
voting rules, such as the k-approval or Borda rule. Neverthe-
less, our hardness result with m = 2 candidates immediately
implies a hardness result with respect to the Borda voting rule.
Furthermore, the notion of uncertainty is a rich topic that
needs to be explored further. Even for the particular kind
of uncertainty introduced in the present paper, there are
many problems that deserve to be studied. For example, it is
interesting to incorporate the probabilistic no-show introduced
by Wojtas and Faliszewski (2012) into our model such that
unbribed voters have some probabilities of no-show (i.e., not
casting their votes); of course, the reason that an unbribed
voter may not cast its vote is different from the afore-discussed
reason that the vote of a bribed voter may not be counted.
Another outstanding future work is to consider the probability
that a voter accepts a bribe. Moreover, the literature focuses
on the setting where the costs of bribery are deterministic.
However, such a cost usually is only an estimation because it
is private to a voter. Therefore, it is perhaps more reasonable to
assume that the probability that a voter takes a bribe depends
on the price offered by the briber.
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